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Chapter 9
Conclusions: Poverty and Morality
However, I do not wish to witness
 the awful spectacle of the Negroes moving upward into the middle class.
I consider this movement a great insult to their integrity as a people.
John Kennedy Toole
Confederacy of Dunces
This ethnography is a case study of people fighting for change in Africa – but the fight
against material poverty is one that current development structures are not equipped to
win.  I argue that we must analyze Malangali in the context of the political and economic
conditions of modernity.  Poverty in Malangali does not exist in isolation from the rest of
the world; rather, the direct global connections with Malangali material conditions
demand that the rest of the world be part of our understanding of poverty and aid in
Africa.  Poverty is a moral issue that academics and concerned citizens must address in
moral terms.  I conclude this dissertation by discussing, from an anthropological
perspective, the moral dimensions of the development endeavor in Africa.
Development aid is the major direct link between Malangali and the world.  This
aid exists, I argue, to meet the charitable needs of people in the donor countries, perhaps
even more than it exists to reach the specific goals discussed in the opening five chapters. 
The aid projects I have discussed achieve the results they do when they expand the
options available to rural residents – and readers turning to this conclusion for a summary
of the specific lessons this dissertation draws from the results of development interactions
in Malangali will find a thorough discussion in the previous chapter.  In this chapter I
1 UNICEF promoted health initiatives for children under 5, including the training of village health attendants
(JNSP 1988), but funding that was low on a per village basis to begin with had all but dried up in Malangali
Division by 1996.  Funding for the Malangali clinic, with the exception of Concern’s one-time construction of a
modest maternity ward, fell precipitously during the decade.
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wish to discuss what is left out by this focus on analyses of rural problems that address
particular problems or inequities.  I assert that development aid addresses some of the
symptoms of rural poverty, rather than the root causes of that poverty.  Through a
discussion of root causes as exemplified by the situation in Malangali, I conclude by
offering some thoughts about policy directions that might help win the fight against
material poverty in Africa.
I start by discussing a few of the many political and economic factors affecting
places like Malangali that stand outside the lens of traditional development analysis.  I
open with a discussion of the healthcare options that Malangali residents face, a section
that aspires to be an independent ethnographic chapter called “Band-Aids, Witchdoctors,
and the IMF.”  Then, continuing the focus on health issues, I discuss alternative ways of
thinking about wealth and knowledge that might address some of the moral aspects of
material poverty.  Finally, I discuss the broad lessons this analysis may hold for
anthropology and development.
Illness
Health is topic of daily worry in Malangali, but one which received little attention
from the funding agencies active in the area in the 1990s.1  Malangali residents articulate
a system of beliefs about illness and healing that fuses concepts of human agency and
2 I use the term “witchdoctor” cautiously.  In many instances doctors of traditional medicine, waganga wa
kienyeji, seek the human agent – or witch, mchawi – who caused illness through sorcery – or witchcraft, uchawi. 
I think “witchdoctor” is therefore a better English translation of this aspect of their professional capacity than the
alternatives “sorcerer” or “traditional healer.”  It is also the English term many Malangali residents use to refer to
this type of medical practitioner.  Geschiere, in a nuanced approach to this terminological dilemma, discusses
the moralizing connotations of the English approximations at translation, but settles on “witchcraft” in large part
because other terms seem “too anodyne to do justice to the fierceness with which the modern implications of
these forces are discussed in Africa” (Geschiere 1997: 14).
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natural pathogens as causes of disease.  In this system, people look to witchdoctors2 to cure
“diseases of man” that can be traced to a human protagonist, and they seek university-
trained doctors to cure “diseases of God” that can be traced to pathogens (Feierman
1985).  In normal times people seek remedies from both kinds of doctor until a satisfactory
diagnosis and cure can be found.  1996 was an extraordinary time because rural
Tanzanians were feeling the effects of recent IMF-mandated cuts in government services. 
Among these cuts in the “social service sector” were cuts in the budgets of health services
such as the Malangali health clinic, and the imposition of fees for services that had
previously been free.  The IMF remains convinced of the rationale behind its structural
adjustment mandates, which involve a rapid transition from socialist-oriented ideals, such
as free public health care and education, toward free-market policies in which Africans
must pay for the services they receive (see especially Lugalla 1995, Sarris and van den
Brink 1993, Campbell and Stein 1992).
For Malangali residents, these cuts meant that their clinic was even less likely to
have needed medicine or material; the clinic now receives one box of supplies every six
weeks, down from two boxes, and uses up most of the kit in about two weeks.  It also
means that patients have to pay for medical examinations that they know may be
Chapter 9. Conclusions: Poverty and Morality 441
ineffective if the illness proves to be a “disease of man.”  They are faced with hard
decisions about how to invest money they do not have in search of a cure that may not
work.  Do they spend the money for an examination at the clinic, get a prescription for
penicillin or another basic medicine that they have to buy at the pharmacy, and hope
they get cured?  Or do they go first to the witchdoctor and hope that, for less money or for
barter goods, s/he can treat a “disease of God” with herbal remedies or diagnose a human
disease agent?  The dilemma is often resolved by starting with the cheapest potential
cures, then seeking the attention of university-trained doctors when an illness has become
extreme.  People are likely to arrive at the clinic when they are close to death, rather than
coming at the onset of symptoms.  I was in a vehicle that picked up one such tuberculosis
patient being discharged from the clinic.  He was carried off the bus near his home, and
was dead within moments.  Tuberculosis is a “disease of God” for which exist known
cures, but financial hardship prevents many from receiving care in time.
I witnessed much suffering that would have been avoided had adequate medical
care been available.  One story best demonstrates the tragic inadequacies of health care in
Tanzania, and how incomplete any analysis of local conditions will be that does not
monitor economic mandates from the Breton Woods organizations or the consequences of
policy decisions based on simplified assumptions of the minimal needs of African village
residents.  I tell this story, which I find extremely sad, explicitly because I want to elicit an
impassioned response in the reader.  I do so despite having spent considerable energy
earlier in this dissertation dissecting aid agency representations of rural Africans that are
designed to elicit sympathy and charity.  At the beginning of this work I stated my
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agreement with the overarching premise of much international aid, that rural Africans
face serious problems of poverty and inequity, and that efforts to transform these
conditions are part of a fight that must continue to be waged.  I put forth, however, that
such efforts at transformation are almost never adequate, for both financial and conceptual
reasons, to address the inequities that perpetuate conditions of material poverty.  By
presenting the story of Mara, Eliot, and their daughter Tuli – a story I have followed for
several years, for which I have rechecked every fact, and that Tuli’s parents have said they
want the world to hear – I want to make the case that social action does have an
important role to play in places like Malangali.  Both action and inaction have effects.  I
argue that representations such as the Concern brochure discussed in Chapter 2 are
dangerous, first because they present a stylized and simplified portrait of the conditions
facing rural Africans, but more importantly because they lead to a complacent acceptance
of facile “solutions” that obfuscate the more radical (and expensive and difficult) actions
that are necessary to address the problems of concern to people in places like Malangali. 
As Colin Leys writes,
for all its shortcomings the great merit of development theory has always
consisted in being committed to the idea that we can and should try to
change the world, not just contemplate it – which means, in practice,
being willing to abstract from the detail, to identify structures and causal
relationships and to propose ways of modifying them (Leys 1996: 196).
My objective in telling this story is precisely to agitate the reader, to argue that small cash
donations will do very little other than assuage our guilt, and that instead we must see
issues of material poverty in Africa as challenges that demand our active political
engagement.
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Blindness Mara was a horticulture extension worker for Concern who was
laid off in a round of staff reductions in early 1996.  She received a severance package of
about 100,000/= (less than $200) that she used as capital to stock a small store.  Her
husband, Eliot, remained in his job as the French teacher at the Malangali Secondary
School.  I hired Mara to transcribe my interview cassettes, which gave her a little more
capital for her small business.  One June morning I was on the jalopy to the main road
when she boarded the bus with her baby on her back and her husband carrying six-year-
old Tuli in his arms.  The adults looked very grave.  Tuli had contracted measles and was
close to death.
The USAID-funded hospital at Ilembula, 70 kilometers away, was able to
resuscitate her, but her condition remained critical.  She had been vaccinated as an
infant, but the vaccines UNICEF supplied were sometimes expired upon arrival at the
village, probably due to an absence of refrigeration.  The family rented a room near the
hospital, staying there six weeks on money borrowed against Eliot’s school salary.  When
they returned to Malangali Tuli was blind, emaciated, and in great pain.  She needed a
certain type of eye-drops that were unavailable in Iringa region.  I used the Concern short-
wave radio to call their Dar es Salaam office with a request that they send me the drops
immediately.  The drops, a brand available in almost every pharmacy in the United States,
were only a few dollars.  The Concern driver in Dar brought them in a big envelope to a
long-distance bus in the capital that left the next morning.  The bus driver slowed enough
640 kilometers later, at the junction for Malangali, so the conductor could toss the
envelope out the door; the next jalopy into Mwilavila brought me the parcel a few hours
3 I should stress, such FedEx delivery was unheard of in Malangali and could not have been orchestrated by any
Tanzanian.  The Tanzanian Concern officer in Dar granted me the favor because he knew I would reimburse
his personal outlay, and because his office exists largely to service expatriate field staff.  At that time I was a
contracted consultant.
4 Eliot’s extended absence had serious repercussions for his students, who had to study for their national Form 4
exams without a French teacher.  None of his students passed the French exam, greatly reducing their chances
for continuing education.  One of these students, who worked for me as a research assistant, was disqualified by
his French scores from going on to Forms 5 and 6, so university disappeared as an option for him.  He enrolled in
a technical school, but he fell ill and used the small savings intended for his education to pay for his own
recovery.
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later, and I pedaled straight to Mara’s house.3  When I arrived, Eliot was by himself.  Mara
had taken the children and gone to the main regional hospital in Iringa, leaving Eliot to
liquidate some assets to pay for continued care.  When he got to Iringa the next day,4
Mara had already continued on to one of the country’s only eye specialists in Dodoma, a
city many hours to the north.  Eventually the family returned to Malangali.  By the end of
my field research, Tuli had recovered the ability to see light and dark in one eye, had put
on some weight, and stopped feeling constant pain.  Most important, she started to believe
her life might again have some light, and even started to smile again.  In 1998 Eliot
recalled what happened a few weeks later.  “I remember the date, it was January 3, 1997. 
We were staying with someone who had a mat on the floor, and Tuli said, ‘There are red
squares.’  There were red squares!  Soon she could see out of that eye, but even today she
has trouble with the other one.  And she still needs those drops from Dar es Salaam
because her eyes don’t make tears.”  By the time she began recovering her eyesight her
parents were heavily in debt, but did not have to close the shop because of their
transcription income.  A year and a half later, they are still paying off their debts and
trying to find ways to make their store profitable.
5 Richard Mackay, an American doctor who has worked in East Africa, suggested to me that her illness may in
fact have been something other than measles, which is generally a disease that strikes during infancy.  Dr.
Diklar Makola, a South African with extensive experience in rural areas of eastern and southern Africa,
thought the symptoms sounded like measles, but that a six-year-old would have to present with a greatly
weakened immune system just prior to exposure to the disease.  A follow-up conversation with Tuli’s parents in
January 2000 revealed that the little girl had been treated for malaria, which would have weakened her
immune system, about two weeks prior to the illness that nearly killed her.  Whatever it was, all her Tanzanian
doctors diagnosed her complications as resulting from measles.  Regardless, most of her suffering likely could
have been avoided were adequate treatment and diagnostic facilities available.
6 The hospital where she stayed is the same one visited by Jordana for fertility help, discussed in Chapter 5, that
receives substantial USAID support for its “family planning” services.
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What makes Tuli’s story extraordinary is that her parents had as much access to
resources as they did.  Bluntly put, had she not had two professional parents, she would be
dead today.  Her parents, extremely well off by local standards, almost went bankrupt
saving her, and her father nearly lost his job.  Tuli’s severe illness was a symptom of
extreme material poverty, where even the hardest-working professionals are excluded from
most resources.  In this story it is easy to overlook one detail: Tuli almost died from
measles.5  Measles!  None of her troubles should have occurred.  Her vaccine should have
been fresh so she would never have contracted the disease.  Once she did, medicines
should have been available in Malangali, and certainly at the central hospital where she
spent six weeks.6  She should not have had to travel hundreds of miles for an eye
specialist.  Her parents should not have had to use their life savings to save her life.  These
are all consequences of material poverty, and they are all moral issues.
Inadequate healthcare has extensive implications throughout people’s lives.  It
means first of all that many basics of preventive medicine are unavailable, so people are
more likely to contract disease.  It means that people often must work in weakened
physical conditions – personal debilitating illness was a frequent topic in the life histories
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people related to me.  It means personal insecurity, a chronic worry for self and loved ones. 
It means many additional births by parents who hope to see a few children survive to
adulthood.  It means frequent funerals of people who could probably have lived healthy
lives for decades more.  It means the financial insecurity of not knowing when you may
need to expend all your assets for an emergency, and it means frequent small contributions
for other people’s emergencies.  It means never receiving a routine physical exam, never
checking for breast lumps or curing yeast infections, never meeting a dentist no matter
how bad the toothache, never getting corrective eyeglasses for poor vision, never having
an x-ray or an HIV test or access to a safe blood bank.  It means never having access to so
many things people in the wealthy world feel is our right, things that improve our ability
to enjoy our lives and lengthen the time we have to enjoy living.
Perhaps I was made especially aware of people’s health problems because it was an
area of expertise many people thought I might be able to help with.  A policeman once
arranged a motorcycle for me to borrow so I could bring his wife, a formerly beautiful
woman, to see the flying doctor about the goiter that grew like a grapefruit on her neck. 
Goiter!  Though we read frequently about the many scary tropical diseases people can
contract in the wilds of Africa, Malangali residents are suffering from diseases we only
remember from 19th century literature.  When Mama Musa, the headmistress of the Ihanga
primary school, suddenly fell ill, the friends holding vigil at her clinic bedside had to bring
their own kerosene lantern so the doctor could treat her at night.  When a woman in
Isimikinyi fell seriously ill, her family borrowed the only wheelbarrow in the village from
Alfred Ndandala, and somehow folded her into it for the two mile ride over the bumpy
7 The clinic keeps detailed records of the number of patients seen and the specific diagnoses, which are then
reported to district and regional authorities.  In an interview in 1996, the head doctor showed me all of the
records for the preceding decade aggregating the diagnoses, by year, for all patients seen at the clinic.  From a
statistical point of view, these records have two serious weaknesses: first, most diagnoses are “best guess”
observations based on reported symptoms, as no testing facilities are available, and second, the majority of
illnesses in Malangali are never brought to the clinic for treatment.
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track to the Mwilavila clinic.  (The Isimikinyi village government subsequently voted to
spend 3000/= ($5) to construct a stretcher out of two poles and bought rubber strips cut
from old truck tires.)  My neighbor Jane, a precocious 3-year-old, will go through life
bearing the stigma of deformed hands with only five fingers total; my step-cousin in
Connecticut had an almost identical birth defect but received reconstructive surgery that
enabled her to grow into a well-adjusted adult without any physical handicap.  The story
of Jordana in Chapter 5 is one of several reproductive health problems I knew of that
would have benefitted from the routine treatments available to almost every woman in
Europe (although, because we do not have nationalized medicine, not necessarily to all
Americans).
People are used to malaria, and seek immediate treatment at the clinic as soon as
they get the recognized symptoms, often a few times a year.  Other diseases about which
public health campaigns disperse information are AIDS and dysentery, a few of the big
tropical diseases, and the childhood vaccinations.  (During my research I witnessed the
successful implementation of the polio eradication vaccinations in the Malangali area.) 
The significant decrease in new sexually transmitted diseases appearing at the clinic,7 in
conjunction with the many conversations I participated in and observed about AIDS,
indicate that people are receptive to important health messages and are willing to adjust
8 I use the term “Band-Aid” here in its American sense, as a generic term and not a brand name, in part to
highlight the connection with the limited efficacy of charitable efforts such as the Band Aid fund drive of 1984-
5, discussed on page 162.  In fact, I do not know of any products made by Johnson & Johnson that are available
in the little stores of Malangali.  The sticking plasters that are available throughout Tanzania are “Elastoplast” –
the Swahili word for Band-Aid is elasto.  Along with most other pharmacological products available in the
country, these are produced by multinational corporations other than Johnson & Johnson.
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their personal behavior when they think it necessary and feasible.  That mothers regularly
bring their children under age five to the monthly weighings and for vaccinations also
demonstrates that people interact with health care as consumers in ways similar to other
development-type programs.  The question I am forced to ask is this: why are their health
care options so limited?
Why are Malangali residents limited to the choice between buying Band-Aids
(and other rudimentary pharmacy products)8 in the small stores, or visiting herbalists/
witchdoctors, or going to horrendously inadequate mockeries of Western medical
facilities?  No argument exists that rural Africans suffer any less pain from treatable health
problems, nor have I heard asserted the proposition that Africans are any less deserving of
treatment.  I have heard people on the street in the wealthy world voice the Malthusian
argument that high death rates are a regrettable but inevitable consequence of
overpopulation – a ridiculous assessment of conditions in sparsely-populated Malangali
and in most other parts of Africa – but I have never heard this argument from people
involved in development planning or implementation.  The contemporary focus on
concepts like sustainability may reveal part of the answer to my question, because Western
medicine may not appear to be “appropriate technology” (see page19 above).
Individual responsibility takes a primacy in African development efforts that it has
9 "Government Orders States to Pay for Viagra," Reuters article appearing on
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/viagra_medicaid980702.html, 7/2/98.
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never been accorded in Europe or the United States.  Nowhere is this shown more starkly
than in health care.  Whether European variations on socialized medicine or American
versions of semi-privatized health insurance, health policy in the North is designed around
a system of healthcare providers paid for from a collective pocket.  Large-scale disease
prevention is achieved by municipal provision of clean water, and public nutritional
balance is effected by mandated micronutrient supplements in many foods, iodization of
salt, and fluoridization of the water supply.  Individuals are responsible for visiting their
providers when they fall ill, and for taking the medicines or following the directions
dispensed by the experts, but are free to be obese, smoke, and drive without wearing
seatbelts while yet having their healthcare paid for by their insurance.  Only lately have
insurance companies even begun to address the preventive measures that individuals can
take, such as exercise and good diet.  In Africa, the approach is exactly the opposite. 
People are supposed to maintain their own health through boiling water, wearing
condoms, growing the right food, using mosquito nets, etc., and only visit the clinic as a
last resort.
In the spring of 1998, the anti-impotence drug Viagra was introduced to the
wealthy world.  Within a few months, the United States government had decreed that
state Medicaid programs must pay for members’ Viagra prescriptions, at a cost to taxpayers
estimated by the National Governors’ Association of over $100 million a year,9 and the
Pentagon had budgeted a further $50 million a year (Silverstein 1999).  In Malangali,
10 It is hardly coincidental that drug companies are among the major contributors to political candidates of both
parties.  Pharmacological concerns aggressively lobby the U.S. government to uphold the protection of their
patents, and the government in turn makes protection of such “intellectual property” a linchpin of its
international trade negotiations.  (Silverstein 1999).
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meanwhile, teacher Alex Uhakula was falling gravely ill with what seemed to be typhoid. 
He suggested I not stand too close to his hospital bed lest I contract the disease, to which I
replied that I had been vaccinated the previous month.  He had never heard of a typhoid
vaccine, and with the cost of the shots being roughly six months’ average income in
Malangali, I know of nobody there who had ever received the injection.  Alex’s illness
came soon after Mama Musa related a long tale of her unsuccessful quest for ulcer
treatment, and around the time I was being called on by various friends to explain how
AIDS in America has become an apparently manageable disease for those with the
$15,000 a year to purchase the latest medication.  How can we insist that elderly
American men have the right to erections at public expense, while people in Malangali
die every week of diseases like typhoid and AIDS for which medications exist?  Rural
Tanzanians die of these diseases not because they are less clever than Americans with
health insurance, but because medications are actively denied to them.10  They do not
have the money, of course, to buy the drugs at market prices.  Nor is it possible for them to
arrange ways of producing the drugs at lower costs, although both the knowledge and the
technology exist to produce unlimited quantities of such medicines.  The knowledge to
produce the medicines is patented, and therefore the protected proprietary interest of a
few enormous pharmacological concerns.  Those with stock in these corporations make
11 I do, and so do most American academics who invest in retirement funds.  The TIAA-CREF “Social Choice”
college retirement equities fund, one of the most socially aware investment options available to educators,
invests in most multinational pharmaceutical and related firms, according to its June 30, 1999 semi-annual report
(p. 31), including: Bristol Myers Squibb, Colgate Palmolive, Johnson and Johnson, Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer,
Procter and Gamble, Schering-Plough, and many others.
12 Alex was bussed to Ilembula hospital a few hours after I left Malangali.  A letter written six weeks later
brought news that he eventually made a full recovery.  My relief was short-lived.  The same letter brought news
of Juma Kinkopella’s death from the illnesses, said to be typhoid and malaria, that had been attacking him for
many months.
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money off those who can pay for the drugs.11  Though it sounds like melodramatic
hyperbole, it is unfortunately closer to understatement: those who cannot enrich the
stockholders are left to suffer and die.  When last I left Malangali, Alex Uhakula was
wasted and wracked with pain, less than a week after we had spent an afternoon doing
vigorous carpentry together.  Not only could he not afford known curative medicines, but
the clinic’s head doctor told me that such drugs were not available in Malangali for me to
buy for my friend at any price.12
Planners voice an aversion to “pouring money at the problems” encountered in
rural Africa.  Pouring money in, the argument goes, has never yet been shown to really
improve people’s life conditions (see the contributions to Bandow and Vásquez 1994,
especially Ayittey 1994).  Expensive projects laden with high inputs cannot thrive
without continued outside support, even if the money is correctly spent for well-designed
goals.  This argument is valid as far as it goes, but it begs the question: Why should all
activity in rural Africa be sustainable?
I return to the topic of sustainability, first discussed in the context of forestry in
Chapter 3.  The concept of sustainability arose from theories of a closed global ecosystem
comprised of many smaller semi-closed systems.  The ecological balance of the planet
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hinges on global consumption patterns that do not damage the biosphere, and global
damage is expressed by many local instances of environmental destruction.  So, planetary
sustainability requires much effort at local environmental sustainability.  Many additional
benefits were then seen to accrue to local sustainability, including continuous access to
environmental resources and income opportunities, but the major initial motivators were
impending catastrophe: global climate change and calculations of the rapidity with which
current consumption trends will use up fossil fuel and natural resources.  In the Malangali
Forestry Program we saw how the ecological sustainability concept segued into economic
sustainability, whereby the tree-planting program was supposed to be sufficiently lucrative
that local entrepreneurs would continue growing and selling tree seedlings even without
external inputs.  The water scheme had an even more radical conversion to the religion of
economic sustainability, insistently adopting the belief that people living on $100 a year
could maintain an enormous $1.5 million engineering triumph.  In the chapters Forest and
Water I discussed several specific problems with the sustainability concept for those
programs.
A close look at the evolution of the sustainability concept as developed in the
previous paragraph shows the disappearance of one crucial condition: the closed system.  I
propose that the utility of the sustainability concept is seriously eroded when it is applied
to systems that are not inherently bounded.  What, for example, are the limits to the
system that could support the Malangali Water Supply Scheme (MWSS)?  The same
agents that crafted the scheme demonstrably have the ability to provide for its
maintenance.  Concern funding could support the program indefinitely without making a
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ripple in the Irish economy.  Innumerable similar projects could also find continued
funding to sustain their work within the small closed system of international aid funding. 
Were the wealthy world to choose to redistribute seriously its substantial financial and
material resources, it could certainly do so without harming the overall global economy. 
Whether the global economic system is sustainable is itself a matter for serious
investigation well outside the scope of this dissertation.  Within that economic system,
though, is where I argue we must locate economic sustainability.  Put another way,
whether a program such as the MWSS is sustainable is a policy decision about distribution
of economic resources, not a question inherent on the ability of people at a local level to
manage those resources themselves.
I assert that health care is a moral issue in which concerns such as sustainability
ought to be irrelevant.  I begin with two premises.  One, residents of areas like Malangali –
or countries like Tanzania – do not have the resources to support a technologically
grounded healthcare system.  Two, the wealthy world has the ability to reproduce such
systems at will.  This second point is demonstrated by recent US government cuts in
funding for hospital resident interns to decrease a perceived domestic doctor surplus, and
by the tens of billions of dollars available for mergers and acquisitions within the Western
healthcare industry.  If the resources are available, and the need exists, then what is
missing is the political will to apply sufficient resources to the problems.  When we talk
about withholding such resources because they are not sustainable, what we are really
saying is that it is not good for Africans to be dependent on Western aid to meet their
needs.  I address aid dependency in more depth below.  I here ask the question, who is to
13 Conceptual problems abound, of course, with any distribution of resources within Africa based on arbitrary
geographic distinctions (Anderson 1990, Ferguson 1990).  Does Swaziland, with fewer than 1,000,000 residents,
qualify for the same 10 hospitals that this model budget would have built in the South African territory that
envelopes it?  How close to the edge of the mainland must island nations be located to be encompassed in a
notion of “Africa”?  For this thought experiment to be effective, it is necessary to request a temporary suspension
of specificity.
14 How much does it cost to build a hospital in Africa?  A fully-equipped 21st century hospital could run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars, including extremely expensive operating, monitoring, and diagnostic equipment
that could treat the full range of conditions currently covered by many American health insurance plans.  Such
a hospital would be able to incubate babies born months prior to term, and sustain cancer patients in misery for
months or years.  The model budget I propose would not come close to meeting such a description.  A process of
triage analysis could choose many highly effective uses for whatever funds are available, and the dollar amounts
proposed in this budget would be extremely significant in the current funding environment.  In addition, many
costs are substantially lower in much of Africa, particularly locally available building supplies and labor; the
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make these judgements about what is good or not good for Africans?  Malangali residents,
when asked what they feel about their health care options, reply that it is bad when
people suffer illness and it is tragic when they die before their time.
I propose a model healthcare budget.  Let us assume for the moment that all
funding were to come as grants from the wealthy world; the political will could exist in the
United States, for example, to augment the $700 million a year we spend on non-
emergency aid to Africa with a slight redirection of the minimum of $798 million a day we
spend on our military for years to come (CLW 2000).  Let us also assume that enough
personnel are or can be trained to get an adequate healthcare system working in not too
many years.  (Capable  personnel are currently available within Africa, though the
educational resources to train them are not.  I refer once again to the footnote detailing
educational scarcity in Tanzania on page 177.)  Now let us take a sweeping step: we are
going to build ten sophisticated hospitals in each of Africa’s roughly fifty countries, and
keep them all running for forty years.13  In this model, each hospital costs $10 million to
build and $10 million a year to run.14  Building costs are therefore $100 million per
university-trained head doctor of the clinic at Malangali earns about $50 per month, and lay staff would eagerly
work for much less than that.  Dikembe Mutombo, an Atlanta-based basketball star from Congo, is currently
raising $44 million to build a large hospital in Kinshasa that is meant to serve a catchment population of about 10
million people, about 1/4 of the country’s citizens.  The hospital “will include state-of-the-art facilities and
equipment, with inpatient beds, an outpatient clinic, emergency services, and a pharmacy.  Other specialized
departments will offer services in surgery, obstetrical care, radiology, and nuclear medicine” (Dikembe
Mutombo Foundation 1999).  Assuming the amount he is raising is based on a sound assessment of local needs
and costs, the numbers proposed in this budget, which include long-term funding, are not too far divorced from
reality.
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country, or $5 billion for the group.  Ongoing costs are $10 million per hospital, $100
million per year per country, $5 billion a year for the group.  Are my cost estimates too
low?  Double them: expenditures are now $10 billion a year.  Did I propose too few
hospitals?  Double the number again: we’re still only spending $20 billion a year.  Are the
estimates still too conservative?  Double the number again, assume $40 billion a year for
something approaching adequate healthcare for residents of the entire African continent. 
$40 billion, not incidentally, is about the amount currently spent on all non-military
foreign aid programs, including health, infrastructure, and all development programs of the
types discussed in this dissertation.  The figure represents a fraction of 1% of the combined
GNP of the world’s wealthiest countries, an amount that would make almost no difference
in the quality of life available to the world’s wealthiest people.
Significantly, while this model budget would initially demand enormous reliance
on imported goods and specialists, it would over time be an engine of indigenous
economies of wealth and knowledge.  Though the three, five, or ten year time horizons of
most aid budgets are inadequate to ensure the establishment of local practitioners with the
educational equivalents of expatriate “experts”, thinking across the span of two
generations would allow government and development planners to implement serious
15 The United States lags behind its wealthy neighbors in the provision of healthcare for its poor, even with
active Medicaid and Medicare programs.  Even the people who do not meet current eligibility standards,
however, are usually able to receive competent care in case of emergencies.
Chapter 9. Conclusions: Poverty and Morality 456
training for doctors, nurses, and medical assistants.  Furthermore, wages and local
purchases of supplies would enter African economies with substantial multiplier effects,
including off-shoot industries.  Finally, the presence of educated health employees and
stable cash flows would stimulate indigenous investments in healthcare and education that
could eventually dwarf aid from outside for systems that, while dramatic improvements,
would remain far from comprehensive.
I argue that, in moral terms, the fact that we have the ability to build and sustain
such health care systems creates the imperative that we do so.  Wealthy societies have all
made the choice within their borders that at least minimally adequate healthcare must be
available to all.15  Unless we are prepared to advance the argument that the life of a person
in a wealthy country is worth more than a life in a poor one, we must make a serious
attempt to distribute to all the health options now available to a select few.
Diagnosis
It may be worth considering how residents of the wealthy world came to be
selected for the benefits of prosperity such as adequate healthcare, and how residents of
areas like Malangali came to be excluded.  Cases where individuals have any special claim
to superior personal health resources are extremely few – perhaps the rare person who has
developed an innovative medical technique, or people who carefully cultivate their own
herbal cures.  Most living Americans and Europeans today benefit from the decisions of
policy makers since the turn of the century to support hospitals, training, and medical
Chapter 9. Conclusions: Poverty and Morality 457
research with public funds.  Americans today also benefit from the struggles of labor
unions in years past to secure health insurance for workers in contracts and in law.  The
wealth opportunities available to living Europeans and Americans derive from an
economic system built on the hard work of our ancestors, but also on centuries of
exploitation both within our borders and abroad.  Most of us cannot claim that we deserve
the health opportunities we have any more than does anyone else.  We can only
appreciate our luck to be born in the time and place we were.  Malangali residents,
meanwhile, still live the repercussions of decisions made during 100 years about what
kinds of economic options would and would not be available to them.  They feel the
continuing effects of an extractive colonial economy that yielded to an extractive
economy of nominal independence.  They live in an economic environment where the
IMF has mandated even more restrictive access to services such as health, even as the
terms of the few export industries in which they can work are eroded by these same
mandates.  Did Europe underdevelop Africa?  Even those who disagree with the concept
of reparations for past injustices can hardly find dispute with Rodney’s basic assessment
that African material poverty is at least in part a direct result of power imbalances created
and perpetuated at gunpoint (Rodney 1972).
In arguing that no person has a unique claim on adequate health care, I also claim
that current medical knowledge should be considered a public resource belonging to all
humanity.  Medical science arises from the same enabling economic conditions that have
enriched wealthy countries and perpetuated the impoverishment of residents of places like
Malangali.  Therefore, despite its current ownership by the beneficiaries of global
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inequities, all people have equal claims to having underwritten today’s medical science. 
The sort of funding I propose in the model above, then, could be viewed less as charitable
grants than the repayment of a debt, or as a return on equity for the sweat invested in
helping construct the modern world.  But again, for people who do not buy the argument
about reparations, I propose a simpler one: right.  A world in which some people live
longer than others, but the capability exists for all to have equally long and healthy lives,
is an unjust world.  In theory the wealthy nations, signatories of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, agree to the principal that, “Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family (sic),
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services” (UN
1948: Article 25).  In practice, however, our commitment to what we speak of as human
rights is extremely narrow, and limited to such egregious cases as torture and forced labor. 
Concepts such as morality, human rights, and social justice are, of course, social
constructions, composed only of the meanings with which people choose to imbue them. 
As with the nebulous concept of development, I suggest we examine what values we
attach to our understandings of right.  I believe that through such reflection we will come
to see that the worthwhile in the process we call development is that which seeks to take
actions to correct ongoing injustices.  We will also see that what is wrong in development
are the stories we allow ourselves to believe, about the correctness and adequacy of our
programs and about the ignorance and incompetence of the people toward whom aid
monies are directed.  If international aid money can be divorced from its connotations of
guilt pacification and social imperialism, and instead meaningful amounts are directed
16 Specifically in the case of the United States, these artifacts of prosperity were bought at the cost of about four
trillion dollars (that is $4,000,000,000,000) of deficit financing to be paid through the taxation (or borrowing) of
future generations.  Deficit financing is made possible through the collective assumption that economic growth
will make such costs relatively more affordable for future taxpayers than for current consumers of public
services.
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toward inequities and solutions about which all parties concur – when aid is seen not as
development but as social action – then a great deal of good can occur.
I propose a thought experiment to distill some of the attitudes toward Africa and
Africans that lay beneath contemporary European charity.  Let us imagine that the
community of nations decides to devote real money to enabling Africans as full players in
the 21st century global economy.  The precedents go well beyond the Marshall Plan.  The
United States, for example, gave massive government assistance to rural electrification
with the Tennessee Valley Authority, subsidized Western commercial agriculture with
enormous irrigation schemes, created the modern transportation infrastructure with coast
to coast highways, used regulated monopolies to make telephone service available to every
citizen, funded higher education, health care, and created a social safety net – all at the
cost of trillions of dollars of public money,16 not through the miracle of the free market. 
The East Asian tiger economies became industrial powerhouses through heavy
government intervention, including sparing private industry expenses such as
infrastructure and education (a.k.a. human capital development).  Most recently, western
Germany has put forward close to a trillion dollars of public money in a friendly buyout of
the lands to the east.  The (re)construction of East Germany is a zealous endeavor to
create a thriving economy through both material changes and a transformation of post-
socialist cultural mores.  When the German transition is complete, the eastern portion of
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the country will have both the appearance of material affluence and the capability of
recreating the conditions of its own wealth.
Africa could, of course, amply wear the garments of prosperity.  The thought
experiment invites us to picture what would be necessary to emulate the second half of a
transformation like Germany’s  –  an Africa capable of maintaining its own wealth in the
global economy.  In brief, economic theory has it right: for people to have material
security, they need the technical skills and capacity to produce goods or services to
generate value equal to or greater than what they import.  Growing small plots of maize is
never going to achieve this result in a world where medicines for an illness such as Tuli’s
can cost many times the profit potential of a year’s surplus grain (see Table 2.1, page 105). 
Instead, I argue, it is reasonable to expect that prosperity in a modern world economy is
contingent on possession of the tools that create modern prosperity, tools such as
infrastructure, electricity, and a populace with the education necessary to create items of
value in the global marketplace.  Infrastructure requirements include systems of roads and
rails, ports, and air transportation; with the experience gleaned from around the world and
the human and natural resources available in Africa, no technical barriers exist to
perfecting such networks.  Electrification, essential for industry and commerce, is also
necessary for full participation in the global economy, and again something humankind
can do well.  Education is more difficult because it takes time to create professional
educators, but there is no human obstacle to populations educated to levels equivalent to
17 Most Malangali parents hope their children will go as far in school as their test scores and funding options will
take them.  Currently the premise behind aid to African education centers on primary schools and assisting a
small number of students to complete secondary school.  Capable, ambitious youth scour Africa in search of
seats at University, or a rare scholarship to study abroad.
18 In this experiment, we will hold agriculture constant.  As people take off-farm jobs, we assume the shrinking
pool of farmers will charge laborers for their food.  This will finance enough investment in agricultural
production to offset reduced farm labor without reducing food supply, an assumption based on ample historical
precedent.
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our own.17  Two other prerequisites for Africans to compete on something approaching a
“level playing field” of world trade, I assert, are access to the machines that the wealthy
world uses to build its own preeminence, such as computers and telecommunications
(Benjamin 1997).18   During my visits to Tanzania I have met all kinds of entrepreneurs,
people eager to exploit any economic niche to secure a small income.  There is every
reason to assume that many people would make the most of any productive opportunity
they see from access to these infrastructural keys to the private club of the prosperous. 
What keeps Africans from prospering in the global economy is not their lack of will, not
their lack of ability, but their lack of opportunity.
Were the world to commit the resources necessary to establish such opportunities
for Africans, can we see any reason the continent should not produce the engines of
wealth that East Asian governments created of their countries, or that Germany is making
of its lesser half?  (I write under the assumption that Asia’s 1998-99 economic problems
will not prove permanent.)  Many obstacles do exist; the thought experiment overlooks,
for instance, unequal distribution of wealth, indebtedness to foreign providers of capital,
and the potential for environmental destruction along the lines seen in Europe.  Such
problems plague European, Asian, and American transformations as well, but experience
19 I gloss over one major obstacle, corruption, that must be accounted for in any circumstance in which large
amounts of money are involved, Africa included. On page 210 I discuss how Concern’s steadfast financial
accounting and their goal orientation worked to overcome the penchant for money to evaporate from
development budgets.  Rampant corruption is a serious obstacle that stymies the best of intentions.  It should
therefore be addressed head-on, in ways toward which Concern might serve as a model; the alternative, tossing
our hands in the air and walking away, will solve nothing.  Corruption is similar to silt in a harbor  –  good port
managers will find ways to keep the harbor dredged and the ship traffic flowing, rather than closing the port
when it becomes clogged with sediment.
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demonstrates that it is possible to deal with them effectively when they become issues of
public concern.  I suggest  –  with intentional provocation  –  that there are no obstacles
to infrastructure development, no obstacles to education, no obstacles to creating the
enabling conditions for Africa’s continuing prosperity  –  except the commitment of
resources.19
The utility of the thought experiment is to ask 1) is such a scenario possible, and
2) if it is, why does nobody ever raise it as an option?  I believe that we have all  
– Americans, Europeans, Africans – consumed the same ideas of development, ideas that
we reproduce in African projects and policies without ever diagnosing their origins.  We
in the wealthy world rely on the experiences of development agencies to convey our
desire for positive social action.  We rely on those same agencies to return to us
information that will justify both our hope and our hopelessness about eradicating severe
poverty.  Few of us are comfortable with a status quo that relegates hundreds of millions of
people to extreme material poverty, but we have no source of information suggesting
serious alternatives.  The only alternative to contemporary development visions offered by
my North Atlantic interviewees is total withdrawal of European support, an option that
can hardly address inequities for impoverished people already thoroughly embroiled in
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global economic and political relations.
I suggest that, instead of despair, we pursue avenues that go to the roots of the
material poverty experienced by so many rural Africans.  The perpetuation of the
conditions experienced by residents of Malangali can be traced to three root causes:
history, opportunity, and power.  Policies and programs that account for the importance of
these factors can do much toward achieving the development goals expressed by planners
and average citizens alike.
1) History.  While the past cannot be undone, it can certainly be given its due.  We must
recognize that the have nots have not because of  histories of subjugation, exploitation,
and marginalization – and that these histories are entirely relevant both in shaping the
world in which we all live, and in framing the ways both wealthy and non-wealthy
understand the present and the future.  This is hardly a new observation, at least for
anthropologists and historians (a point well developed by contributors to Cooper and
Packard 1997, and well detailed by Ferguson 1997 and Roseberry 1989).  Yet history and
the present circumstances that it creates remain absent from most considerations of the
planners and donors we have met in this dissertation, largely on the assumption that
development must deal with where we are going rather than dwelling on where we have
been.  Without recognizing the historical forces that have led to present situations,
however, we are unlikely to understand the present well enough to steer the future toward
more equitable directions.
2) Opportunity.  One major point of this dissertation is that Malangali residents have the
full ability to subsist on the crops they know how to produce, but that growing such low-
20 Mass industrial production of luxury consumption goods in polluting factories is not the only available model
of job creation.  An educated people can sustain a tremendous variety of jobs in the service sector – teachers,
doctors, clerks, software engineers, poets.  Even the heavy industry that is generally concurrent with twentieth
century wealth need not involve exploitation and belching smokestacks.  Given today’s technology, Africa
could produce its own advanced wind and solar generators without much more difficulty than building new
facilities to extract energy from fossil fuels.  A plethora of other industries, heavy and light, could easily be
imagined – refrigeration, hypodermic needles, electric cars, microprocessors – that would satisfy existing and
future demands, and even produce goods that (because they come from newer, more efficient factories than
the behemoths in the industrialized world) would produce goods for export.  In the current economic and
conceptual climate, though, in which governments have no ability to budget beyond what the IMF and World
Bank will tolerate and in which private investors have few incentives to invest their capital in risky Africa, the
scenario above seems destined to remain in the realm of imagination.
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value crops as maize will never give them the income to secure for themselves even the
minimal conditions of material prosperity.  It should strike the reader as curious that the
public and most politicians in the United States and Europe agree that the keys to a
successful economy are jobs that pay well and post-secondary education – except in the
case of peasants in places like Malangali who should make do with maize farming and
basic literacy.  Malangali residents, on the other hand, undertake extensive sacrifices to
educate themselves and their children, and spend years or, reluctantly, decades far from
home selling their labor to anyone who will pay.  I argue above that we should invest not
insignificant resources to establish in Africa the availability of health care not unlike that
we have come to expect as our right.   Here I extend the same argument to the concerted
creation of jobs and post-primary education.  Paid employment of a skilled workforce is
what enables a complex, money-based economy to recreate the conditions of its own
wealth.  Malangali residents understand this, and the fantasy that electrification might
someday enable a factory to open in their area brings a twinkle to many people’s eyes.20 
Yet a concerted effort to promote the investments that would create jobs, such as
Operation Bootstrap that transformed the Puerto Rican economy after World War II
21 Deborah Sabater’s unpublished 1999 term paper for the Yale course “Development and Underdevelopment”
presents excellent original research documenting the successes and limitations of the Puerto Rico project.  In
Operation Bootstrap, large governmental expenditures on social services such as health and education were
combined with a system of tax relief for companies providing employment on the island, over time fostering an
economy that is a model for the Caribbean.
22 “Empowerment” becomes a line in the theater of the absurd when used, as it now often is, by such agencies as
the World Bank.  The Bank, as it is quick to point out, depends on stability in order to implement its programs
and receive repayment  –  the exact opposite of what might occur were the disenfranchised suddenly to
demand their due.  The word “empowerment”, in development jargon, has thus often melded with the concept
of “participation” that I discussed on page 231 as devoid of meaning.  As Schmitz writes emphatically (1995: 59),
“more ‘participation’ ends up reinforcing the Bank’s role, even though more real democracy in developing
countries would quite likely reduce it!”
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(Sabater 1999),21 is something that planners and donors have never raised to me as a
possibility.  Never, not once, nobody.  Why does something as basic as job creation, the
economists’ mantra in the wealthy world, sound almost heretical when proposed for rural
Tanzania?   Yet without opportunity, it is unarguable that current conditions of material
privation will continue, if not become worse.  I suggest that, by becoming enculturated in
the worldviews discussed in this dissertation that have led to the creation of institutions of
development, we have circumscribed our conceptions of how the world could be.
3) Power.  I have demonstrated that Malangali residents are configured by planners and
donors as inadequate in almost every aspect of their lives, and have themselves come to
accept this analysis with relative equanimity.  A major consequence of this imbalance is
that they have no power to demand or cause changes to their economic or political
conditions.  Programs aimed at “empowerment”, which appear elsewhere in Tanzania,
were barely visible in Malangali; my limited observations of such programs in action
elsewhere cause me to question the amount of power that can be claimed through
externally-directed programs that do little to challenge the status quo.22  Again, the
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observation that power disparities underlie poverty is far from new.  Speaking of rural
women in Egypt, for example, Mitchell (1991: 22) writes, “[a]ny discussion of their
situation would have to start from this condition of powerlessness.”  What I would add to
such an analysis is this: powerlessness is a fact of life that many people have come to
accept as natural.  As long as planners, donors, and rural African residents all conceive of
the inability of the rural poor to effect change to their conditions as part of the order of
things, real changes will not occur.  Changes in power dynamics will not occur as a result
of “democratization” movements that encourage elite groups to shape their differences into
multiple parties.  Nor will they occur as a result of, for a Malangali example, seminars that
seek to advise women of their legal rights.  To the contrary, I submit that meaningful
change – elimination of the material conditions of poverty – can only occur when the
residents of places like Malangali have a real voice in the policy and funding decisions that
affect their lives.  Listening to that voice will not be easy.  In most current development
interactions, it is not done.
Cure?
The existence of aid organizations demonstrates a deep discomfort with a world in
which such massive inequities continue.  Private donors wish they could do something to
help people less fortunate than themselves.  Acts of individual donation, and the acts of
polities to use tax money for overseas aid, suggest that many people in the wealthy world
would be amenable to a strong case for the just repatterning of such global inequities as
healthcare availability.  I argue that the single most problematic aspect of contemporary
development discourse is that morality is obscured by practicality.  Although the Brandt
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Commission’s assertion, that there are “great moral imperatives” to make the world a less
unequal and more just and habitable place, was influential in the way the development
project was seen throughout the 1980s, the result has been the “preservation of hope”
(Brandt 1980: 77) rather than the actuality of material improvement for the lives of the
poorest.  Development agencies make decisions about what is possible based on the
financial and conceptual resources they have available.  Such decisions are pragmatic, yes,
but they are also Faustian.  Agencies make the bargain that they will tinker at the edges of
global injustice without ever addressing the injustices per se, in exchange for which they
are allowed to tinker.  Their campaigns do not alienate their publics by making the tasks
seem larger than individual donations can help address, but by offering hope through such
inadequate efforts, they silence any voices that may point to their futility.  I think this is a
mistake.  I think a significant proportion of people like those I interviewed in places like
Dublin would respond to a realistic assessment of the magnitude of the injustices affecting
the poorest countries.  Rather than being shocked at the futility of current aid efforts,
many would demand real action by the governments that are accountable to them.  The
charitable impulse is fundamentally moral, while aid currently obscures the perpetuation
and amplification of immorality.  There is room for change.
If aid continues to cast itself in technical rather than moral terms, it risks
undermining its own existence.  Three competing theories advocate against aid as it
currently is.  These challenges, from right, left, and center, are unanswered by complacent
arguments for gradual “development.”  I examine them individually:
Free markets  The theoretical paradigm that has driven governments and
23 The authors of course neglect historical events such as the Marshall Plan and the E.C. financing of poorer
regions of Europe such as Ireland, discussed above, not to mention the massive international borrowing by the
U.S. to finance our current prosperity.
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multilateral aid organizations from the right since the 1980s is the magic of open markets
and free trade.  From this perspective, development as enacted since World War II is
misguided if not detrimental because it inhibits the forces of capital growth that have led
to prosperity in now-wealthy countries:
In short, it appears that multilateral aid, instead of helping developing countries,
has actually hindered their economic progress.  Throughout the Third World,
multilateral agencies have subsidized harmful economic programs, financed the
growth of already burdensome public sectors, and increased recipients’ foreign debt
burdens....  To the contrary, development can occur without aid, and, indeed, is
more likely to result if multilateral aid and the domestic impediments to growth
financed by it are eliminated.  In fact, the now-rich nations of the West would not
have emerged from poverty years ago had they depended on outside help (Bandow
and Vásquez 1994: 5-11).23
Aid is a crutch that should be removed except as an enabling device for market growth,
for example in the development of infrastructure.
What aid continues should be economically sustainable, meaning that financing
should ultimately be repaid by the beneficiaries rather than be grants or gifts.  In this light,
the most popular development “solution” of the 1990s is the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank
model of microlending.  Such models conveniently overlook the huge disparities that
microloans fail to address, the fact that such schemes alone cannot in our lifetimes bring
even a modicum of prosperity to the economically powerless.  Global economic structures
are so heavily weighted against people in places like Malangali that most will be unable to
depend on anything other than small farming and the whims of whether the market will
buy their produce.  The staple goals of development aid – education, child health, clean
24 Note that “dependency” in this context refers only to reliance on aid, rather than the Marxist-inspired
“dependency school” discussed on page 16 that argued that underdevelopment in the non-wealthy world was
dependent on the active marginalization of poor countries at the periphery of the international capitalist system.
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water, environmental resource protection, food security – are not at all addressed by free
market theories, even when the language pretends at inclusiveness.  I argue that the
necessity of such objectives ought to be more clearly articulated by aid programs.  Instead,
free market programs such as Structural Adjustment eviscerate what limited effort is given
to addressing these very real concerns of people in places, like Malangali, at the periphery
of global economy.
Dependency A somewhat related argument with left-liberal foundations holds
that aid is problematic because it makes impoverished people dependent on hand-outs
from the wealthy world.24  That aid programs administered by expatriates treat residents of
places like Malangali as objects is a point with which I agree.  The aid-dependency
analysis continues, though, to hold that the objectification of the underdeveloped other
creates people who are incapable of lives and desires outside the parameters of the
development imagination.  In the worst case, development bears the engine of subjugation
in the creation of a docile labor force for international capital and/ or is the vessel through
which will arrive the blandness of commodified global culture that makes us all consumer
cogs of international capital.  As Marianne Gronemeyer writes:
“Help”... is a means of keeping the bit in the mouths of the subordinates without
letting them feel the power that is guiding them.  In short, elegant power does not
force, it does not resort to the cudgel or to chains; it helps.  Imperceptibly the state
monopoly on violence transforms itself, along the path of increasing
inconspicuousness, into a state monopoly on solicitude, whereby it becomes, not
less powerful, but more comprehensively powerful....  And finally, it is no longer
true that help is the unpredictable, anomalous instance.  Instead it has become
Chapter 9. Conclusions: Poverty and Morality 470
institutionalized and professionalized.  It is neither an event nor an act; it is a
strategy (1992: 53-4).
A sentimental version of contemporary dependency thought is concerned with culture
loss and the destruction of those things that people today hold essential to their identities,
creating “the one and only way of thinking” (Ramonet 1997):
[I]n human history, at least up until the scientific and industrial revolutions, the
technical knowledge necessary for survival had mostly remained non-centralized
and radically dispersed.  Literally millions of arts and technologies existed – all
using a vast variety of accumulated knowledge and productive of a huge quantum
of goods, cultural ideas and symbols stemming from the rich diversity of human
experience...  In many ways, this technical diversity of the human species more or
less paralleled the genetic diversity of nature itself....  Science and its experts [now]
decide how human beings would be brought up, trained, and entertained, and
what they should consume (Alvares 1992: 227-8).
If development aid is the juggernaut for Western cultural imperialism, then it creates an
external dependency that ought not be countenanced.  I argue that such views overlook
the many real ways in which residents of places like Malangali are already thoroughly
embedded in the modern order.  In addition, many artifacts of prosperity, such as
healthcare, are things that the poorest actively seek.  Withholding such artifacts out of a
romanticization of cultural survival is at best misguided.  Whether responding to rightist
theories of the free market or leftist theories of aid dependency, proponents of morally-
based aid efforts should stress that the refusal of readily available means of improving the
security of the lives of the poorest constitutes a grave injustice that goes directly against
the wishes expressed by many.
Disillusionment and fatigue   Whether from articulated theoretical premises or
pure frustration, international aid faces perhaps its greatest loss of funding from the center,
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from the sense of repeated failures of the development endeavor.  Though development
theorists remain eternally optimistic in their regular reformulations of their justifications for
their existence, I argue in Chapter 6 that publics in the wealthy world face evidence that
all their sympathetic donations and tax contributions have made not a whit of difference
in the lives of the poorest.  European governments are reducing funding for many aid
efforts in the light of their inefficacy, and private donations are also well down from their
1985 Band Aid peak.  One Danida employee in Iringa lamented to me the negativity of a
documentary recently aired in Denmark deriding the many projects the Danes financed in
Tanzania.  The documentary led to public rebuttals by Copenhagen technocrats, but also
to a fortress mentality within the organization.  Instead of a forceful case that aid fails
because it is inadequate to address structural problems, aid agencies attempt rearguard
defenses of their government-derived budgets.  
I believe that anthropology is in the unique position to make coherent both the
debilitating problems and tremendous potential of international aid for the people among
whom we work.  I conclude by discussing why the very notion of development is difficult
to reconcile with anthropological theory, and how such a reconciliation may prove
fruitful.  As mentioned above, one branch of aid-dependency thought holds development
activity dangerous because it threatens romantic notions of indigenous ways of life.  A
separate, predominant stream of anthropological thought accepts change as part of human
life.  At least since Wolf (1982), a large part of the anthropological project has explored
the political economy of interactions between the forces of modernity and the people
anthropologists study (for example Haugerud 1995, Gewertz and Errington 1991, Peters
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1994).  This dissertation is an outgrowth of this stream of analysis, explicitly seeking the
connections between practices of development and a rural African population.
Where I locate the conceptual problem of development for anthropologists is in
the holdover social evolutionism, discussed on page 14, in development premises. 
Evolutionism remains in popular and certain academic discourse long after it has been
discarded by anthropology.  Development is premised on a notion of evolutionary change
from primitive to modern, with the contemporary wealthy world as the eventual
destination for all people.  Economic development especially seeks to incorporate all
people within a modern economic order that, it is assumed, will dispense prosperity to all. 
Of course, any serious economic analysis would dispel quickly any notion that the world’s
most disadvantaged people could find material prosperity in modern systems given their
position relative to the forces of international capital, but the futility of the schema does
not prevent its wholesale dissemination.  Economic development programs seek to
catapult “underdeveloped” people into prosperity by educating them to a limited extent in
skills for the global market.  Though development economists will object vociferously, this
is a late-Maoist approach to Marxist dialectics: Marx’s theory of history, the evolution of
society and economy from one mode of production to the next, continues to undergird
the dismal science, modified only by the rejection of industrial communism as the
endpoint.  Maoism sought to leapfrog an essentially agrarian people directly to industrial
socialism, similar to what Nyerere sought for Tanzanians, an agrarian-based proto-
25 Among the few books available in the bookstore of the University of Dar es Salaam in 1992 were piles of thick
hardcover collections of the works of Mao, selling for 10 shillings each (about 3 cents at the time).  While the
proximate cause for the availability of these books was the presence of the Chinese Foreign Press office in Dar,
the underlying reason for a Chinese government propaganda outlet in Tanzania can be traced to the mutual
sympathies between the nations’ governments during the 1960s and 70s.
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socialism that yet brought modern prosperity.25  Development economists seek for
Tanzanians an agrarian petty-capitalism in which peasant farmers can prosper at the
fringes of global industry.  This reformulation of Maoist Marxism continues to posit an
isolated, backward African awaiting the evolutionary catalyst.  A more nuanced review of
Malangali history shows that the conditions of area residents derive largely from their
century of colonial and post-colonial interactions with globalizing forces.  The
anthropological problem with economic development thought is not that such theories
seek to change indigenous cultures, but that they fail to understand the ways
contemporary peoples are intertwined with modernity.
Other aspects of the development endeavor rankle anthropologists for reasons that
should be spelled out, and that hold other implicit evolutionist assumptions.  “Community
development,” a feature of many programs like that in Malangali (see Ishumi 1981,
Chitere 1994), cannot help but disturb us.  The unit of analysis for anthropologists has
long been society as embodied by small communities.  While we no longer adhere to a
functionalist anthropology that confers an inherent logical unity on the social forms of
these small groups, we continue to appreciate the many ways people craft their lives.  The
implication of community development, and much of the development project writ large,
is that without outside aid, areas such as Malangali are socially dysfunctional.  The
hundreds of development messages I have discussed throughout the dissertation are, I
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argue, as much outgrowths of this perception as they are analytical responses to local
conditions of poverty.  As such, development premises stand at odds with a century of
empirical anthropology that negates the intellectual or social superiority of those with
economic and political power.
Attempts at ideological change in the name of development are perhaps even
more irksome to anthropological sensibilities.  Efforts such as those discussed regarding
women in Chapter 5 attempt to transform social thought from almost explicit evolutionist
precepts.  The practices and beliefs of residents of areas like Malangali are seen to be
wrong in some essential particulars, such as gender relations.  Even to an anthropologist
who does not admire particular social attributes, and who feels no sentimental attachment
toward seeing them perpetuated, ideological change in the naturalizing name of
development appears as striking hubris.  While we may be sympathetic, for instance, to
efforts to transform conditions we may see as oppressive to African women, our hackles are
raised by the implication of the evolved moral superiority of the development message.
I do not think most of the development personnel I have met would object to my
characterization of the changes sought by their programs.  Several would argue that their
personal understandings are closer to my own than the above paragraphs give them credit
for, and based on our discussions I would agree.  I state the case in polar terms, however,
to make stark the tension between anthropology and development in terms I have not
seen discussed.  Because development agents and anthropologists often work in the same
areas, and often work together, it is necessary that we accentuate the inherently
incompatible aspects of the theoretical groundings of our disciplines.
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Because it is a moral issue, anthropology must continue to engage poverty in Africa
from an activist standpoint.  We must be advocates for the people we work among and
interpreters for the wealthy world whose actions so steadily affect them.  Because it is a
moral issue, international agencies must continue their efforts to eliminate material
conditions of poverty in Africa, but they must do so while seriously reevaluating their
actions in light of the concerns raised in this dissertation and other ethnographic writings. 
And because it is a moral issue, discussion of the problems of poverty in Africa must be
expanded beyond the “experts” – beyond anthropologists and development planners. 
Ferguson’s analysis, that development discourse depoliticizes political processes within
rural Africa, should be extended and given urgency: international aid programs
depoliticize African change and poverty internationally, both at the sites of action and
among residents of the wealthy world.  Wider publics – in Malangali, in Dublin – must be
involved in debates about both poverty and the morality of current global economic
structures.  Only through such an expanded discussion can we cease being development
consumers, and become actively engaged in finding solutions to the problems of poverty
and morality that will be the challenge of the 21st century.
